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Abstract: In analytic political philosophy, it is common to view state-sponsored 
injustice as the work of a corporate agent. But as I argue, structural injustice theory 
provides grounds for reassessing the agential approach, producing new insights into 
state-sponsored injustice. Using the case of eugenic sterilization in the United States, 
this article proposes a structurally-sensitive conception of state-sponsored injustice 
with six components: authorization, protection, systemization, execution, enablement, and norm- 
and belief-influence. Iris Marion Young’s models of responsibility for agential and 
structural injustice, and the place of state-sponsored injustice with respect to these 
models, are also discussed.  
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You knew the reasons were wrong but you found ways to justify your 
wrong. Not just your wrong—your wickedness, cowardliness. You found 
ways to justify it. You said that they would produce a generation of people, 
of children, that would be feebleminded, inept, unable to care for 
themselves… But they brought out their personal intentions to attack my 
mother and other women; they brought out their personal desires and they 
used the state’s money and the state’s authority to bring this punishment 
upon my mother and people like my mother. 
 
- Tony Riddick, Testimony before the Governor’s Task Force to Determine 
the Method of Compensation for Victims of North Carolina’s Eugenics 
Board 1  
 
                                               
1 Final Report of the Governor’s Task Force to Determine the Method of Compensation for Victims of North Carolina’s 
Eugenics Board, January 27, 2012, https://files.nc.gov/ncdoa/JSV/FinalReport-GovernorsEugenics 
CompensationTaskForce.pdf, D-9. Quote edited to standardize spelling and punctuation. 
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Analytic political philosophers often consider state-sponsored injustice to be 
the work of a corporate agent, the state, whose decision structures allow it to act 
volitionally. Yet as I argue in this article, structural injustice theory gives us reason to 
reassess and expand the agential approach to state-sponsored injustice. As Iris Marion 
Young observes, social action is mediated by structural processes which, in countless 
ways visible and invisible, formal and informal, macro and micro, organize and 
regularize human behavior.2 Structural injustice results when individuals and 
institutions conform to these processes, pursuing “their particular goals and interests, 
for the most part within the limits of accepted rules and norms,” yet collectively wrong 
others. Usually it is those already subject to various forms of “domination and 
deprivation” who are wronged.3 
If state-sponsored injustice is agential injustice, it might seem to have little to 
do with structural injustice. Agential injustice is often taken as structural injustice’s 
opposite—the former characterized as direct and intentional, the latter indirect and 
unintentional. Yet the writings of Young and other structural injustice theorists 
describe how individuals are conscripted into wronging without their full awareness. 
Injustice often takes place as a result of long-term processes. Broader social structures 
render some populations unduly vulnerable to injustice. Though there may be good 
reasons to represent the state as a corporate agent, these insights are nevertheless 
germane to state-sponsored injustice. An analysis of state-sponsored injustice shows 
that the agential and structural approaches need not, and indeed, should not be 
juxtaposed as opposites.  
In this article, I advocate a structurally-sensitive conception of state-sponsored 
injustice. By way of illustration, I use the case of eugenic sterilization in the United 
States, describing the societal and political circumstances that led to the subjection of 
over 65,000 individuals to compulsory sterilization surgeries. A six-part framework 
shows the operation of state-sponsored injustice’s agential and structural aspects: (1) 
the injustice is authorized by the state, (2) the injustice is legally protected, (3) procedures 
by which the injustice is to be carried out are systemized, (4) state officials execute the 
injustice, (5) the injustice enables other injustices, and (6) the injustice can impact the 
norms and beliefs of society at large.  
An insight into the nature of state-sponsored injustice follows from the 
analysis—namely, that exercising political authority enables those who wield it to do 
things that they would have difficulty carrying out in its absence. This notion is 
conveyed vividly in the prefatory quotation. Tony Riddick’s mother Elaine had been 
sterilized against her will after she had given birth to him, labeled “unfit” and 
“feebleminded” by the state of North Carolina. On Tony’s view, given the “wicked, 
cowardly” intent behind eugenic sterilization, it needed the cover of the law to take 
                                               
2 Young, “Responsibility and Global Labor Justice,” Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 4 (2004): 365–
388; and Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
3 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 52. 
 3 
place at all. Political authority might accordingly be thought of as having a privileged 
nature. 
Reflecting on the privileged nature of political authority and thinking through 
state-sponsored injustice from the standpoint of those immediately harmed, the idea 
of an agential state is appealing. A person non-consensually sterilized according to 
state law is reasonable to think of “the state” as responsible and as the proper object 
of blame. As I argue, for the purposes of accountability, political officials acting on 
behalf of the state qua corporate agent should accept blame and make efforts to repair 
harms that were done. Nevertheless, as I argue, a structurally-sensitive conception of 
state-sponsored injustice gives rise to a more expansive conception of harm than is 
typically recognized on the agential model. Though a given state-sponsored injustice 
can cause first-order harms to particular individuals, it can also contribute to more 
diffuse harms by reinforcing existing unjust structures and creating new ones. 
 
Rethinking the Agential View of State-Sponsored Injustice 
In contemporary colloquial usage, the term “injustice” often refers to a moral 
wrong or wrongs embedded in a systemic context.4 Philosophical use of the term 
largely reflects this. For instance, much recent work on “epistemic injustice” centers 
on wrongs done to individuals by individuals, e.g., when a hearer discounts an 
interlocutor’s credibility (“testimonial injustice”). However, the concept of epistemic 
injustice is deeply intertwined with identity-based prejudice: a person is stereotyped 
and devalued based on her social group membership.5 Using the language of 
“epistemic injustice” as opposed to “epistemic wrongdoing” reflects that there is a 
social and institutional context that is a vital part of the phenomenon. 
As in the case of epistemic injustice, the term “injustice” itself often applies 
when a person’s social group membership is the reason they experience a wrong or 
wrongs. Defining injustice as a systemically-embedded moral wrong encompasses this, 
but is a broader notion. For example, we might reasonably speak of all future persons 
as the victims of climate injustice—though it is expected that some will bear 
disproportionate burdens due to their nationality, race, and socioeconomic class—
based on the systemic factors contributing to climate change.   
State-sponsored injustice, as its name suggests, is a moral wrong caused by the 
state’s policies and practices; the systemic context that the wrong is situated in is the 
context of the state. But, as with epistemic injustice, an act of wrongdoing can be 
systemically-situated and still interpersonal. Is this the case for state-sponsored 
injustice, where interpersonal-type harms are done by one agent—the state, a 
                                               
4 Young’s discussion of the definition of injustice is not extensive, but suggests a similar understanding, 
e.g., in this passage: “Political contestation about structural injustice entails making arguments that some 
of the sufferings of people is in fact injustice, that is, caused by processes in which many participate” 
(Ibid., 149). 
5 Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 4. 
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corporate agent—to other agents? Or is state-sponsored injustice more like climate 
injustice, a structural injustice in which individuals and institutions create harms by 
acting in ways shaped by broader social structural forces?6 My argument is that an 
agential understanding of state-sponsored injustice, though not without merit, can be 
greatly enhanced by structural injustice theory. Let us first look at structural injustice 
theory, and then turn to the conception of the state as an agent.  
Structural injustice is a circumstance of unfairness that precludes simple 
assessments of guilt and blame. Rather, structural injustice results from structures, viz., 
patterns of individual and institutional behavior, the invisible rules that describe them, 
and the resources that undergird them.7 In addition to climate change, the concepts of 
“structure” and “structural injustice” have been applied to topics like gender and 
sexism, race and racism, global labor injustice, global poverty more generally, 
immigration, colonialism, and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.8 
As Young argues in a 2004 article and in her posthumously published book 
Responsibility for Justice, when it comes to agential wrongdoing in the interpersonal 
context, responsibility is assigned to “particular agents whose actions can be shown to 
be causally connected to the circumstances for which responsibility is sought.”9 Young 
is critical of this “liability model” of responsibility not because it is invalid per se, but 
because it is so dominant that situations of structural injustice are not properly 
understood. She uses the example of a single mother, Sandy, who faces homelessness 
after unreliable public bus transport causes her to lose her job. Unable to make rent, 
Sandy is evicted. To look for a particular blameworthy agent misses the fact that a 
complexity of social processes have converged to create Sandy’s situation.10  
On the simplest version of the liability model, there is only one blameworthy 
agent, and that agent is an individual human being. However, agents are defined as 
                                               
6 Robyn Eckersley, “Responsibility for Climate Change as a Structural Injustice,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Environmental Political Theory, ed. Teena Gabrielson et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
346–61. 
7 William Sewell’s classic definition in “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation,” 
American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (1992): 1–29, which is cited by Young (Responsibility for Justice, 60-
61), refers to patterns, rules (“schemas”), and resources. 
8 See Young, “Responsibility and Global Labor Justice,” Responsibility for Justice, and “Katrina: Too Much 
Blame, Not Enough Responsibility,” Dissent 53, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 41–56; Máriam Martinez, “On 
Immigration Politics in the Context of European Societies and the Structural Inequality Model,” in 
Dancing with Iris: The Philosophy of Iris Marion Young, ed. Ann Ferguson and Mechthild Nagel (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 213–28; Catherine Lu, “Colonialism as Structural Injustice: Historical 
Responsibility and Contemporary Redress,” Journal of Political Philosophy 19, no. 3 (2011): 261–81; Serena 
Parekh, “Getting to the Root of Gender Inequality: Structural Injustice and Political Responsibility,” 
Hypatia 26, no. 4 (2011): 672–89; Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Part II; Jade Larissa Schiff, Burdens of Political Responsibility: 
Narrative and the Cultivation of Responsiveness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Eckersley, 
“Responsibility for Climate Change”; Clarissa Rile Hayward, “Responsibility and Ignorance: On 
Dismantling Structural Injustice,” Journal of Politics 79, no. 2 (2017): 396–408. 
9 Young, “Responsibility and Global Labor Justice,” 368; Young, Responsibility for Justice, 97. 
10 Young, Responsibility for Justice, Ch. 2. 
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having the capacity to act, a capacity which is not limited to individual persons.11 There 
can also be corporate agents, in which an assemblage of persons act as a group, with 
the group’s actions non-reducible to the actions of the individuals within it.12 Like 
individual agents, corporate agents can have intentional states: Internal processes and 
procedures, sometimes called “corporate internal decision structures,” allow 
intentional actions to be decided on in the corporate agent’s name.13 
Many analytic political philosophers regard states—along with companies, 
religious groups, civil associations, political parties, etc.—as corporate agents.14 The 
idea of the state as a corporate agent suggests that state-sponsored injustice is a form 
of agential injustice that can be understood on a liability model. A number of authors 
have assumed precisely this in inquiring into the relationship between state-sponsored 
injustice and political subjects, and the grounds upon which liability for the state’s 
injustices can be distributed to citizen-taxpayers.15  
The idea of the state as a corporate agent is moreover supported by ordinary 
language. As Andrew Vincent observes, “[W]hen we speak of the state performing 
actions we personify it, we attribute to it a status equivalent to a unique personality—
an agent or subject which acts.”16 We only need to compare grammar found in ancient 
works (like Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War: “It was evident before that 
Sparta was plotting against us, and now it is even more evident”) and present-day news 
headlines (e.g., “Syria Blames Israel for Attack on Damascus Airport”) to see that state 
agency is a long-standing tradition.17 The trope of the body politic is an even more 
explicit representation of the state as a unified whole, capable of acting volitionally. 
Indeed, the state as a political concept rose to much greater prominence with the 1651 
                                               
11 In addition to their capacity to act, List and Pettit specify that agents, including corporate agents, have 
representational states and motivational states in Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate 
Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 20. 
12 List and Pettit, Group Agency. 
13 See David Copp, “On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from ‘Normative 
Autonomy,’” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30, no. 1 (2006): 194–221, esp. 197-200; and Peter French, 
Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 
14 See, e.g., Robert Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 35; Philip Pettit, “Responsibility Incorporated,” Ethics 117, no. 2 (2007): 171–201, 199; Copp, 
“On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities” (note that Copp uses the terminology of “collective” 
rather than “corporate” agents); Anna Stilz, “Collective Responsibility and the State,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 19, no. 2 (2011): 190–208, 191-196; List and Pettit, Group Agency, 40; Avia Pasternak, “Limiting 
States’ Corporate Responsibility,” Journal of Political Philosophy 21, no. 4 (2013): 361–81, 363; and 
Stephanie Collins, “Distributing States’ Duties,” Journal of Political Philosophy 24, no. 3 (2016): 344–366, 
344. 
15 See, e.g., John Parrish, “Collective Responsibility and the State,” International Theory 1, no. 1 (2009): 
119–54; Eric Beerbohm, In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2012); Robert Jubb, “Participation in and Responsibility for State Injustices,” Social Theory and 
Practice 40, no. 1 (2014): 51–72; Stilz, “Collective Responsibility and the State”; Pasternak, “Limiting 
States’ Corporate Responsibility”; and Collins, “Distributing States’ Duties.” 
16 Vincent, Theories of the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 8. 
17 In Group Agency, List and Pettit detail the tradition of personifying group agents generally (170-185), 
and states-as-agents in particular (180-181). 
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publication of Hobbes’ work on “that great Leviathan, called a Commonwealth or 
State,” which analogized the state to an artificial man.18  
However, the agential conception of the state is hardly uncontroversial. 
Though the idea of the state’s corporate agency suggests a unified entity with clear 
boundaries demarcating it from society, the state does not always act as a whole, and 
the boundaries between the state, society, and societal institutions can be obscure. 
Moreover, government officials who work on the state’s behalf often have 
contradictory motives and aims, and it can never be supposed that all are in agreement 
about a given decision or work in concert to advance an outcome. For these reasons, 
there was a deliberate push among mid-twentieth century political scientists to forgo 
the concept of the state in order to make room for a more pluralistic discussion of the 
different functions of government.19 Not only is the state’s corporate agency rejected 
by these scholars, some have gone as far as to call the state a “myth.”20 
Aspects of the history of eugenic sterilization, the subject of the next section, 
reveal precisely the sort of back-and-forth between society and state that makes some 
want to dispense with the latter. For instance, who exactly is a government actor? One 
of the major figures in the push for eugenic sterilization laws was Harry Laughlin, the 
director of the influential Eugenics Record Office in Cold Spring Harbor, New York 
and co-founder and president of the American Eugenics Society. Laughlin was also 
the author of Eugenical Sterilization in the United States, a lengthy playbook for getting 
sterilization laws enacted by state-level legislatures.21 At the time he wrote this book, 
Laughlin was a “Eugenics Associate” of the Psychopathic Laboratory, a research 
center run by the Municipal Court of Chicago. The Municipal Court held the copyright 
for and published Eugenical Sterilization; its introduction was written by Harry Olson, 
the Municipal Court’s Chief Justice. Eugenical Sterilization proved to be a major step 
towards converting the idea of state-mandated sterilization into statutory law. Did it 
emerge from inside the government, or is Laughlin better characterized as an activist 
and key player in the American eugenics (social) movement?  
 Timothy Mitchell, in his treatment of the debate in political science over 
jettisoning the concept of the state versus “bringing the state back in,” argues that the 
“state-society divide is not a simple border between two free-standing objects or 
                                               
18 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994), 3. See Martin 
van Gelderen, “The State and Its Rivals in Early Modern Europe,” in States and Citizens: History, Theory, 
Prospects, ed. Quentin Skinner and Bo Stråth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 79–96, 90-
91. 
19 David Easton, “The Political System Besieged by the State,” Political Theory 9, no. 3 (1981): 303–25; 
Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” American 
Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 77–96. 
20 Philip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977),” Journal of Historical Sociology 1, 
no. 1 (1988): 58–89. 
21 Laughlin, Eugenical Sterilization in the United States (Chicago: Psychopathic Laboratory of the Municipal Court 
of Chicago, 1922). 
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domains,” but rather “a complex distinction internal to these realms of practice.”22 He 
wants to center the ambiguous boundaries of the state as a means to understanding it. 
If Mitchell is right, we should resist trying to assign Laughlin to the state or to society, 
and take away an important lesson about the disunity of the state.  
 A viable theoretical treatment of state-sponsored injustice should acknowledge 
this disunity. At the same time, as Mitchell observes, though the state is not 
autonomous from society and not a unified whole, there is nevertheless a sense in 
which social and political processes produce a domain of the state.23 From within this 
domain, it is possible to talk about state agency: If there are processes by which it is 
decided that φ will be done in the name of the state, if a critical mass of state officials 
and employees act together to carry out φ, and if φ takes place, it is reasonable to 
consider φ an action of the state, with φ non-reducible to the actions of the individuals 
who work to carry it out.24 Accordingly, whereas paradigmatic cases of structural 
injustice involve actors coordinating their behavior despite being unaware of the 
structural factors leading them to do so, paradigmatic cases of state-sponsored 
injustice begin with intentional practices undertaken by actors who deliberately make 
use of the state’s procedural apparatuses. This does not necessarily mean that state-
sponsored injustice is carried out by individuals who appreciate or even realize the 
harm inflicted by a given practice. But the practice is intentional, even if the harm is 
not. This gives us reason not to entirely dispose of the agential understanding of state-
sponsored injustice.  
 At the same time, it should not be supposed that state-sponsored injustice is 
the work of “an entity above and apart from the rest of society, somehow hovering 
over it.”25 A conception of state-sponsored injustice needs to be structurally-sensitive, 
and take into account the embeddedness of the state in society. Individual agents exist 
in society, and therefore in particular social structural contexts; as in the case of 
epistemic injustice, this is an indispensable aspect of harms that are done. Similarly, 
the societal context of a given state-sponsored injustice is essential to understanding 
its course. More generally, we can observe that state processes are a medium through 
which those advantaged by social structural formations can preserve their advantages 
                                               
22 Mitchell, “Limits of the State,” 90. See also Peter B Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda 
Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); cf. Easton, 
“Political System.” 
23 Mitchell, “Limits of the State,” 95. 
24 Some would disagree with the claim that φ is non-reducible to the actions of the agents who carry it 
out. By contrast, authors who have argued against “eliminativism” or “singularism” include Copp, “On 
the Agency of Certain Collective Entities”; and List and Pettit, Group Agency. This debate is part of a 
larger one over methodological individualism and nonreductionism—see, e.g., Christian List and Kai 
Spiekermann, “Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation,” 
American Political Science Review 107, no. 4 (2013): 629–43. 
25 Easton, “Political System,” 309. 
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(whether this is knowingly intended or not), while patterns of structural inequality 
leave some susceptible to state-sponsored injustice.26 
 In proposing a structurally-sensitive conception of state-sponsored injustice 
that nevertheless does not reject state agency, it is fitting to ask: Are structural theories 
and agency at odds? Sometimes this is thought to be the case. If structures are entirely 
deterministic of individual decision and action, then indeed, agency has no place. Yet 
for Young and many other structural injustice theorists, individual freedom and agency 
are possible.27 Structures are formative, not determinative, when it comes to individual 
choices. The conception of state-sponsored injustice that I present shows agency at 
multiple loci, and tries to capture the complex interplay of different kinds of agents 
with each other and with state and non-state structures. Within this interplay, some 
agents clearly play a greater causal role than others, and exhibit greater intent. I try to 
show how the contingent activities of particular individuals who use their power, 
resources, and will to getting a law or policy enacted can play a decisive role in a given 
state-sponsored injustice. This may raise the question as to who should be held 
responsible for state-sponsored injustice: should it be only these particular individuals? 
Though there may be cases where accountability—even criminal accountability—is 
appropriate for liable individuals, state-sponsored injustice has the badge of the state’s 
authority, and thus requires the cooperation of many agents within government. This 
lends itself to a picture of responsibility where government officials accept blame on 
the state’s behalf.28 
The next section turns to eugenic sterilization in the United States, and outlines 
a framework for understanding state-sponsored injustice with six components: 
authorization, protection, systemization, execution, enablement, and norm- and belief-influence. A 
few methodological reflections are in order before proceeding. I see eugenic 
sterilization as a paradigmatic case of state-sponsored injustice. It is precisely the kind 
of state-sponsored injustice which many analytic political philosophers would be 
tempted to attribute to the state qua corporate agent whose responsibility the liability 
model explains, without mention of social structural processes or effects. For this 
reason, eugenic sterilization is conducive to demonstrating the central claim of this 
paper—namely, that important aspects of state-sponsored injustice are structural, and 
that a conception of state-sponsored injustice should be structurally-sensitive. The six-
part framework is an attractive way of modeling eugenic sterilization’s structural 
aspects, while leaving ample room for both individual and corporate agency. But how 
dependent is the framework on the case study at hand? How representative is eugenic 
                                               
26 Additionally, we might observe that fundamental aspects of the state are structural, for the definition 
of a structure encompasses state processes—some, including Young, Responsibility for Justice, 142, would 
say all state processes. Much scholarship, particularly in the Marxist tradition and in IR, has been 
devoted to analyzing the nature and extent of the state’s structurality, and this article’s aim is to theorize 
state-sponsored injustice, not to theorize the state. Therefore, I do not take a stand on whether all state 
processes are structural or not, nor do I think my argument depends on my doing so. 
27 E.g., Haslanger, Resisting Reality, Ch. 11, defends this position. 
28 The final section discusses this picture of responsibility. 
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sterilization of other state-sponsored injustices? Can all state-sponsored injustices be 
understood on the framework?  
Many claims made in the case of eugenic sterilization are intended to be 
applicable to other cases. As Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster 
point out, the “very meaning of the word ‘case’ implies that what it refers to is a case of 
something.”29 On John Gerring’s definition, a case study is “an intensive study of a 
single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of units.”30 Though hailing 
from empirical social science, this understanding applies to the use of case studies in 
philosophy.31 Young, for example, discusses the post-September 11 U.S. security state 
to make claims about masculinist protectionism, sovereignty, and war that are 
applicable in a variety of contexts.32 Her analysis of global labor injustice is meant to 
elicit insights relevant to other cases of structural injustice.33 Similarly, my analysis of 
eugenic sterilization aims to shed light on other cases of state-sponsored injustice. 
Furthermore, I consider eugenic sterilization to be a paradigmatic case. It is, in 
Giorgio Agamben’s phrase, “a singularity which in some way stands for all the others” 
in ways that non-paradigmatic cases wouldn’t.34 Because eugenic sterilization is 
formally authorized by law, the state’s central decisionmaking apparatus is implicated, 
and it is in keeping with conventional perceptions to consider “the state” as 
responsible. But some cases of state-sponsored injustice might not involve the kinds 
of structural effects I identify with the categories of enablement and norm- and belief-
influence; some might not be systematized or protected in the way I describe. Other 
cases, viz., non-paradigmatic cases, might concern state-sponsored injustice which is 
not formally authorized. Nonetheless, using the six-part framework to analyze eugenic 
sterilization discloses insights relevant to a wide range of cases that would 
uncontroversially be described as state-sponsored injustices—though as Gerring 
writes, “theory confirmation/disconfirmation is not the case study’s strong suit.”35 
                                               
29 “Case Study and Generalization,” in Case Study Method, ed. Gomm, Hammersley, and Foster (London: 
SAGE Publications, 2000), 98–116, 102. 
30 “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 2 (2004): 
341–54, 342. 
31 David Thacher, “The Normative Case Study,” American Journal of Sociology 111, no. 6 (2006): 1631–
1676, identifies normative case studies as distinct types of case studies alongside the more commonly-
recognized methodologies of causal and interpretative case studies. He focuses on their use by 
sociologists like Jane Jacobs in The Death and Life of Great American Cities. However, he is also interested 
in how philosophers like Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1993), have drawn from such accounts (1642-1644), and in the possibility of philosophers themselves 
producing normative case studies (1670). Note that Thacher does not mention, and may not have been 
aware of, the case studies by Young referenced here. 
32 Iris Marion Young, “The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State,” 
Signs 29, no. 1 (2003): 1–25. 
33 Young, “Responsibility and Global Labor Justice.” 
34 Giorgio Agamben, “What Is a Paradigm? European Graduate School Lecture” (August 2002). I thank an 
anonymous reviewer for recommending this essay, and for helping me clarify my sense here.  
35 Gerring, “What Is a Case Study,” 350. 
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Gerring also observes that case study authors tend to “overreport,” that is, to 
“provide all facts and hypotheses that might be relevant” regardless of their 
generalizability, a tendency that will be all-too-apparent in the next section.36 However, 
the case study method should not be discarded, Gerring argues, for it is unique in both 
the depth of the analyses it is able to provide, as well as its being a “boon to new 
conceptualizations.”37 If I am right that analytic political philosophers tend to 
understand state-sponsored injustice as the work of a corporate agent simpliciter, this is 
an area ripe for many new conceptualizations. I hardly expect my six-part framework 
to be the last word on the matter. 
 
Theorizing State-Sponsored Injustice: The Case of Eugenic Sterilization   
The practice of eugenic sterilization, which resulted in irreversible surgeries on 
over 65,000 Americans, did not take place in a vacuum. The implementation of eugenic 
sterilization laws occurred (1) more specifically, in the broader socio-ideological 
context of eugenics in American society and beyond, and (2) more generally, against 
the backdrop of significant structural injustices whose existence bred eugenicist ideas.  
 British scientist Francis Galton, inspired by the writings of his half-cousin 
Charles Darwin, devised the term eugenics—“good in birth”—in 1883.38 By the mid-
1920s, eugenic ideas had spread across Europe, to North and South America, and to 
Russia, Australia, and New Zealand.39 In the U.S., the early exponents of eugenics were 
scientists and philanthropists, typically white, affluent, and progressive. These 
individuals founded organizations like the American Eugenics Society, the Race 
Betterment Foundation, and the Galton Society. By the early twentieth century, a full-
fledged social movement was underway dedicated to promulgating eugenics. Because 
of the eugenics movement, those who attended state fairs could take part in “Better 
Baby” and “Fitter Family” contests, and see exhibits that bore slogans like “Some 
people are born to be a burden on the rest” and “Every 15 seconds $100 of your 
money goes for the care of persons with bad heredity.”40 As the crusade took off, 
books like A Eugenics Catechism interpreted biblical passages (“Do men gather grapes 
from thorns, or figs from thistles?”) in a eugenic light.41 Students were exposed to 
eugenic ideas in their biology textbooks, films like “Are You Fit to Marry?” appeared 
                                               
36 Ibid., 346. 
37 Ibid., 350. 
38 Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (New York: Random 
House, 1997), 59. 
39 For more on the history of eugenic sterilization, see Roberts, Killing the Black Body, Ch. 2; Wendy 
Kline, Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of the Century to the Baby Boom 
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in theaters, and journals like the Eugenics Review and Eugenical News kept eugenics 
devotees informed of scientific and political developments. 
 The societal context of eugenic sterilization laws in the U.S. is the American 
eugenics movement; their implementation cannot be understood without it. However, 
it also cannot be understood without another societal context: significant structural 
injustices around class, race, and gender (though men were sterilized, over time women 
emerged as the primary target), as well as implicit norms about able-bodiedness and -
mindedness. Eugenics as a scientific theory and practice was motivated by the idea of 
stamping out those thought to be a drain on society’s resources: poor people, women 
viewed as having weak morals, persons with physical and cognitive disabilities, and 
persons with mental illness. It was also a racial project, based fundamentally on racial 
hierarchism, and aimed at purifying and perfecting the white race. In its most 
pernicious form, eugenics lent scientific backing to the idea of racial extermination, 
reaching its height in Nazi Germany.42 However, Dorothy Roberts writes that the racial 
threat of eugenics to black Americans was not “the actual elimination of the black 
race” but rather “the biological justification of white supremacy.”43  
 We will see how the state practice of eugenic sterilization was able to reinforce 
existing structural injustices along the lines of race, class, ability, and gender, and 
contribute to new structural harms. But before getting into this subject, as we can 
observe, structural injustice on its own cannot provide a full explanation of why 
eugenic sterilization laws were enacted in 30 U.S. states. We must turn to the actions 
of agents who specifically sought their authorization.  
 
Authorization 
Recall the idea that the state’s corporate agency involves structures that allow 
intentional decisions to be made on the state’s behalf. Authorization refers to the 
process by which an idea makes its way through the state’s internal processes, 
establishing that it will be adopted as a policy or practice of the state.  
Why should the governmental authorization of an unjust practice matter? 
What incentives motivate authorization-seeking agents? Though some unjust practices 
either benefit from illegality or could not readily justify their purpose in political 
terms—e.g., organized crime—there are many reasons for a practice to have 
government endorsement or to be formally carried out by the state. For one thing, 
legality can expand the reach of the practice. Taxpayer resources, state institutions, and 
state officials can all be deployed in the practice’s service. Moreover, large-scale 
injustice may occupy murky legal waters, if it is not outright illegal. Changing the law 
is one way to accommodate the injustice. 
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Indeed, in the early 1900s, a handful of states passed laws mandating the 
compulsory sterilization of men and women considered to be “feebleminded.”44 
However, these were subject to a variety of legal challenges. Indiana was the first state 
to enact a eugenic sterilization law, but its Supreme Court invalidated it on the grounds 
that it inflicted cruel and unusual punishment, denied sterilization targets due process, 
and violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And so, in 
1922, prominent eugenicist Harry Laughlin published his book Eugenical Sterilization, 
which was largely devoted to introducing a “Model Eugenical Sterilization Law” 
designed to surmount constitutional obstacles that emerged in Indiana and elsewhere. 
To counter the charge of cruel and unusual punishment, Laughlin’s model law 
emphasized that the law’s motive was “Purely eugenic, that is, to prevent certain 
degenerate human stock from reproducing its kind. Absolutely no punitive element.”45 
Since male sterilization targets were often inmates, this was a necessary stipulation. To 
provide due process, contested cases would be heard by a State Eugenics Board.46 
Finally, “class legislation” was argued to withstand the equal protection clause if the 
class divisions were natural and if there existed a pressing social purpose that the law 
served. As Laughlin analogized, compulsory vaccination was a kind of class legislation, 
but had been upheld by the courts due to its medical importance.47 Indeed, this was 
mentioned explicitly in the majority opinion of the 1927 Supreme Court case 
considering the constitutionality of state-mandated sterilization, Buck v. Bell. 
With the help of Laughlin’s model law, eugenic sterilization began making it 
on the books in state after state. Here we can see different kinds of agents influencing 
the path of state-sponsored injustice. First, Laughlin is a quintessential example of an 
individual agent who behaved intentionally and freely in working to get eugenic 
sterilization laws enacted. He was not merely acting upon beliefs common in his day, 
but was rather a driving force of the advancement of eugenic ideas and practices. 
Second, the state legislatures that enacted eugenic sterilization laws fit the 
definition of corporate agents. Legislatures are not synonymous with states; there are 
thus corporate agents within and alongside corporate agents. The United States 
government as a whole, the state of Indiana as a whole, the Indiana General Assembly, 
the Indiana Supreme Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court—along with agencies and 
administrative bodies like social welfare bureaus, state hospitals, and Eugenics 
Boards—all function as corporate agents. In relation to one another, these corporate 
agents are the visible markers of the state structure—though we usually think of “the 
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United States government” or “the state of Indiana” as the prototypical states-as-
corporate-agents. 
Third, eugenic sterilization is typical of many cases of state-sponsored injustice 
in which the personal identities of agents involved in the process of authorization 
reflect structurally unjust relations of political power. In the 1920s, state officeholders 
were generally white, male, and well-to-do. While there was certainly dissent in state 
legislative debates over eugenic sterilization—particularly shaped by a well-organized 
Catholic opposition48—it was not vocalized by those who would be most affected by 
the proposed laws. 
In spite of the importance of formal legislation in the case of eugenic 
sterilization, enacting a law is not the only way for an unjust policy or practice to be 
authorized by state actors in the state’s name. It might rather traverse established 
channels of communication and command within the executive, police, military, or 
bureaucratic arms of government. In common-law countries, a practice can be 
authorized by way of judicial precedent. Also, it is worth noting that in the case of 
eugenic sterilization, the state’s authorization of an unjust practice was relatively direct: 
eugenic sterilization was authorized by eugenic sterilization laws. Authorization can 
also take place more indirectly. For example, as part of the New Deal, the Roosevelt 
administration created the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, which offered low-
interest mortgages to homeowners. To do so, it produced color-coded maps of cities 
depicting some neighborhoods as riskier than others. The practice that came to be 
known as “redlining” referred to marking black neighborhoods as high-risk, even if 
middle class, undermining the ability of black families to receive home loans. This was 
a gradual process, and observers may be tempted to consider state actions as ancillary 
to the actions of members of society. But, as Richard Rothstein argues in his recent 
book, redlining is a matter of de jure and not just de facto segregation.49 It lets government 
actors off the hook to say otherwise. When it comes to authorization, direct and 
indirect governmental actions may not be as different as they initially appear. 
Of course, a given individual’s disadvantaged place in society can be explained 
by myriad state policies and societal factors that interact in complex ways. The concept 
of structural injustice exists precisely to think through such circumstances. By contrast, 
paradigmatic cases of state-sponsored injustice involve identifiable individuals 
experiencing identifiable harms causally attributed to specific state policies or 
practices.50 In the context of eugenic sterilization, that identifiable individuals 
experienced identifiable harms is clear enough. In the context of redlining, Ta-Nehisi 
Coates writes about black Chicago residents who formed the Contract Buyers League 
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and fought for restitution in “The Case for Reparations”—these individuals and others 
in their position are redlining’s immediate victims.51 
The category of authorization captures the idea that states have internal 
processes and decision procedures that determine the content of the activities and 
undertakings carried out by state officials in the state’s name. When a legislature passes 
a law, a military officer signs an order, or a bureaucratic agency sets a policy for itself, 
this is often the first step that sets a state-sponsored injustice in motion. But even 
though authorization usually comes first, the remaining categories—protection, 
systemization, execution, enablement, and norm- and belief-influence—do not happen in a 
sequence. They are different facets of a multi-faceted phenomenon, and many are 
operative at once. 
 
Protection  
In Indiana, sterilization surgeries were conducted for two years beginning in 
1907, then stopped for over a decade after hospital superintendents and doctors 
became fearful about the possible legal repercussions. Speaking before the Indiana 
General Assembly in 1921, Governor James Goodrich expressed his disapproval of 
the cessation. “Ever since Governor Marshall raised the question as to the 
constitutionality of the present law authorizing the desexualization of inmates of 
certain institutions,” Goodrich stated, referring to Indiana’s governor in 1909, “it has 
been a dead letter and no serious attempt has been made to enforce it.”52 Goodrich 
explained that he “repeatedly urged” state hospital superintendents “to take advantage 
of the present law and desexualize all persons who would be fit to return to their 
homes.” But the superintendents “pretty generally have declined to enforce the law 
for fear of personal liability in the event the law should be held invalid.”53  
Courts serve different functions in different contexts, and not all countries 
practice judicial review in the manner of the United States. But in the American system, 
and elsewhere where courts hear challenges as to the legality or constitutionality of 
laws and policies, the judiciary may provide protection for an injustice that has been 
authorized. The example of Indiana’s sterilization law is pertinent because it shows 
that even though a law may direct an injustice’s execution, if not protected by the 
courts, officials do not always agree to execute the law. The same year that Governor 
Goodrich spoke before the General Assembly about the importance of enforcing 
Indiana’s sterilization law, the Indiana Supreme Court heard Williams v. Smith and 
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officially declared it unconstitutional.54 Laughlin’s Eugenical Sterilization published the 
proceedings of Williams v. Smith in full, setting key passages in bold type, with the aim 
of showing how his model sterilization law was responsive to the court’s objections.55 
Virginia was first to pass legislation using Laughlin’s template in 1924. After 
the Supreme Court gave the Commonwealth permission to sterilize Carrie Buck in 
Buck v. Bell, many states either passed new sterilization laws or revised existing ones to 
be more in line with Virginia’s.56 By 1930, sterilization laws were on the books in 30 
states, and the number of sterilizations that had taken place in the U.S. doubled.57 The 
Supreme Court’s approval was clearly crucial for the practice’s proliferation.58 Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote the majority opinion, upholding the Commonwealth’s 
argument that sterilization was to the benefit of those who would undergo the 
operation. Sexual licentiousness and feeblemindedness went hand in hand, thus a 
feebleminded person could not be out in society without supervision; she would not 
be able to resist mating.59 As an alternative to institutionalization, sterilization was 
freedom-enhancing. “Defective persons… if now discharged would become a menace 
but if incapable of procreating, might be discharged with safety and become self-
supporting,” as Justice Holmes wrote.60 However, there was undeniably an even 
greater overall societal benefit, as described in the opinion’s most famous passage:  
 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best 
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who 
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to 
be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with 
incompetence. It is better for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime or to let them starve for their imbecility, society 
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind... Three 
generations of imbeciles are enough.61 
 
The Buck decision—backed by a vote of 8 to 1—was a decisive victory for 
American eugenics movement. Had the Supreme Court struck down Virginia’s law, 
this would have brought the practice of eugenic sterilization to a halt. Moreover, given 
the efforts on the part of the American eugenics movement to characterize its aims in 
terms palatable to ordinary Americans, it was significant that Holmes endorsed the 
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same arguments being messaged by prominent eugenicists. That the Court ruled 
compulsory sterilization to be within the legitimate scope of state power helped to 
disguise the injustice of the practice, and indeed, that die-hard eugenicists were driven 
by the same ruthless fanaticism that many condemned as the eugenic practices of the 
Nazis came to light.  
Thus far we have seen individual agents, more specifically, powerful figures 
like Harry Laughlin and Oliver Wendell Holmes, shaping the course of eugenic 
sterilization laws. We have also isolated governmental bodies acting as corporate 
agents to establish and preserve eugenic sterilization as a practice of the state. When 
agents make harm-causing decisions in their capacity as public officials, we often hold 
them responsible for their “dirty hands,” as Dennis Thompson observes.62 However, 
Thompson argues, when numerous officials contribute to harm, a more apt 
characterization is that of “many hands,” complicating assessments of responsibility.63 
We will see this with the next two categories.  
 
Systemization  
An unjust practice broadens its impact as the activities of state institutions and 
personnel are coordinated to conduct it. Here, new state processes are devised by 
which officials in different capacities work together, promoting efficiency and creating 
mechanisms of accountability for seeing the injustice through. As a result of 
systemization, individual agents are assigned the task of carrying out a state policy, and 
taxpayer resources are directed to realizing its ends. Systemization, in short, describes 
the state structures set up to implement an authorized practice. 
Systemization involves redefining the roles of existing officials and assigning 
new duties, as well as creating new roles altogether, to ensure that the policy is put to 
practice.64 Roles often fall on officials because of their being written into a law that 
they had a part in crafting during the authorization stage. Hospital and prison 
superintendents, for example, were vital to the systemization of eugenic sterilization 
in the state hospitals, mental institutions, and prisons where the surgeries took place. 
Whether because of their actively endorsing eugenic beliefs or the perceived benefits 
that a eugenic sterilization law would bring about, superintendents were key figures in 
lobbying for and crafting sterilization laws.65 To take another example, it was fitting 
that the most enthusiastic supporters of eugenics should be assigned to their State 
Eugenics Board, given their interest and presumed expertise. As superintendents 
systemized the practice of sterilization at the level of individual institutions, Eugenics 
Board officials saw to its systemization at the level of state government. State social 
workers were trained to observe the families assigned to them for signs that a woman 
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would be a candidate for sterilization, and were provided the protocol for reporting 
out-of-wedlock pregnancies.66 At state hospitals, superintendents coordinated 
personnel to board individuals whom the social workers brought in. (At prisons and 
mental institutions, sterilization targets were identified from the inside.) Psychiatrists 
were assigned to administer tests of feeblemindedness, physicians to report on the 
physical health of the patient, and obstetricians to perform sterilization surgeries. State 
Eugenics Boards would convene periodically to review medical reports and make 
recommendations on disputed cases. 
Systemizing the efforts of state institutions and personnel lends officiality to 
an unjust practice. Officiality often facilitates easy acquiescence. Due to the nature of 
existing structural inequalities, eugenic sterilization is perhaps an extreme case. In 
prisons and mental institutions, the sterilization targets were already incarcerated, 
susceptible to power dynamics that made it more likely that they would comply with 
the superintendent or psychologist’s will. Targets outside of the institutional setting 
were often equally vulnerable. Many were barely teenagers, sometimes living in foster 
care or orphanages; no meaningful distinction was made between a girl’s licentiousness 
and her being the victim of child abuse or rape. Frequent visits from a social worker, 
being told that one needed to come in for a tubal ligation and ought to sign this form, 
thus had a predictable effect.67 
The systemization of state-sponsored injustice normalizes it. Though usually 
this is a point made in the context of despotic regimes, it also applies to non-
authoritarian political settings. One needed not buy into the idea of eugenics to simply 
go along with it, to play one’s role. This becomes even clearer in the next category of 
the framework.  
 
Execution 
The systemization of an injustice involves assigning roles to state officials and 
determining procedures by which these roles are carried out. As roles are assigned and 
procedures fall into place, the execution of an injustice comes about with little effort; to 
use Arthur Applbaum’s phrase, it benefits from a “division of moral labor.”68 If one is 
a doctor, correctional officer, or social worker who is undecided on the morality of 
eugenics, it is easy to not make a decision about its morality, yet go along actively 
promoting eugenic aims. Once an injustice is authorized by law, and responsibility for 
its execution is parceled out and coordinated by procedures, what is one to do but do 
one’s role?69 True, one may become sympathetic to the victims of injustice. In this 
case, one is faced with the difficult decision of staying in one’s role so that there is a 
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person on the inside, undermining the injustice in various ways. Or, one can quit—
perhaps publicly and dramatically, hoping that others will follow suit and that this will 
grab the public’s attention.70 But whatever one does as an individual, a state-sponsored 
injustice already set in motion is difficult to obstruct or overturn. Meanwhile, much 
harm can be done. 
And all too often, the heroic civil servant does not emerge. On the contrary, 
state officials sometimes see themselves as deputized to further the cause of injustice 
by whatever means, even those that run contrary to the letter of the unjust law. Many 
sterilizations took place without an individual’s knowledge. To doctors and public 
officials, it seemed “inconsistent to require both that the client consent and be 
feebleminded”; there are documented requests as to whether “some of the ‘red tape’ 
[could] be cut in regard to the consent of the feebleminded adult.”71 It was common 
for consent forms to be forged, or signed by an illiterate parent or spouse with an ‘X’.72 
Later on, forms were written so obscurely as to basically ensure that a person who 
signed them would not understand their purpose, appended by a legal clause absolving 
all medical staff of liability.73 And in a number of cases, there would be no forms at all 
authorizing the procedure; the sterilization would take place during a cesarean section 
without a doctor bothering to even go through the motions of consent. Later in life, a 
woman would have trouble getting pregnant and see doctor, and she would be told 
that her fallopian tubes had been severed. Some women never found out at all. Though 
it is tempting to put all the blame on “bad apples,” the state is nevertheless responsible 
for surgeries carried out by state doctors without due process, given the circumstances. 
If in practice due process became an illusory formality, if women who signed papers 
without requesting a hearing consistently underwent surgery without a clue what was 
happening, then it is only a matter of degrees before one does not feel obliged to 
consult with a sterilization target at all; the outcome is the same in every case.  
As we move from the authorization and protection of eugenic sterilization laws 
to the systemization and execution of eugenic sterilization, the picture of state-
sponsored injustice becomes more complex. It is not simply that one set of decision-
making agents acting on behalf of the state inflict the harm of sterilization on other 
agents. As Young writes: 
 
[I]f we seek a few powerful actors to blame, we will let many ordinary actors 
doing their jobs off the hook. A public discourse of blame then oversimplifies, 
failing to develop a public understanding of the actions and practices whose 
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consequences produce injustice. The power of some actors is improperly 
inflated, and that of many others is ignored.74 
 
Some ordinary actors doing their jobs are more culpable than others: a doctor who 
performs illicit sterilization surgeries is surely worse than a social worker who fights 
for her client to have due process. But in the involvement of a multiplicity of agents 
who are variably culpable, the structural dimensions of state-sponsored injustice’s 
enactment are plainly shown. 
 However, it is not only the enactment of state-sponsored injustice that is 
structural. State-sponsored injustice gives rise to diverse harms. Besides the first-order 
harms to particular sterilization targets, there are also structural harms that are more 
diffuse. This is depicted by the final two categories.  
 
Enablement 
A given state-sponsored injustice can interact with established patterns of 
structural injustice, contributing to the entrenchment of these patterns. It can 
moreover recur in different forms over time, impressing unjust social goals that 
recurrently make their way into political practice in new and unforeseen ways. These 
are two facets of enablement, which describes how state-sponsored injustice facilitates 
and amplifies structural injustice.  
Consider first the interaction between state-sponsored injustice and structural 
injustice when it comes to race and racism. Hansen and King argue that initially, the 
American eugenic quest for racial purity was primarily about the betterment of the 
white race.75 White people were the main targets for sterilization, while other eugenic 
tactics like antimiscegenation laws were used to prevent racial mixing.76 However, 
increasingly after World War II—as procedures to obtain consent were becoming 
laxer—women of color were sterilized in disproportionate numbers. The commonly-
used idiom “Mississippi appendectomy,” for example, denoted the nonconsensual 
sterilization of a black woman during abdominal surgery.77 A Government 
Accountability Office audit found that Indian Health Service doctors sterilized 3,406 
Native women in four of the twelve service regions it examined between 1973 and 
1976.78 If the regions surveyed were representative, 25% of American Indian teenage 
and adult women were sterilized during this period—some researchers put the 
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percentage even higher.79 Studies found that the doctors believed that sterilization 
created fewer welfare recipients, lessening their own tax burdens, and that American 
Indians were incapable of learning to use birth control.80 Expressing a similar 
sentiment regarding sterilization in Puerto Rico, a Eugenics Quarterly author wrote, “A 
drastic measure by American standards, it is a godsend to a population not sufficiently 
educated and motivated to practice systematic birth control.”81 Roberts describes 
“armies of public health workers” peddling what was called la operación to Puerto Rican 
women; as of 1968, a staggering one-third of those in their childbearing years had been 
sterilized.82 “Eugenic policy may have been motivated by many forms of domination,” 
writes Roberts. “But history shows that it has a particular affinity for racial hatred.”83 
 This brings us to the second prong of enablement. It can be difficult to 
eradicate state-sponsored injustice after it has been authorized by law: surgeries under 
the supervision of Eugenics Boards were phased out over time, ceasing to be 
widespread after the 1970s, yet coercive sterilization still made a resurgence in 
California women’s prisons in the 2000s.84 However, it is even more difficult to 
eradicate the social goals whose existence precipitates and is legitimated by the 
injustice. Consider, for example, Susan Thomas’s claim that “To be a woman, poor 
and fertile, in the United States in the 1990s is to be blamed by politicians and social 
reformers for an increase in poverty and alleged immorality in society.”85 Or as Nancy 
Fraser and Linda Gordon wrote in 1994, “In current debates, the expression ‘welfare 
dependency’ evokes the image of ‘the welfare mother,’ often figured as a young, 
unmarried black woman (perhaps a teenager) of uncontrolled sexuality.”86 In her article 
“Three Generations of Welfare Mothers Are Enough,” Nicole Huberfeld argues that 
the 1996 U.S. workfare initiative contained many measures designed to lower the 
birthrate for single mothers receiving public assistance. Compared to eugenic 
sterilization, the provisions that Huberfeld discusses are mild. But her overall point 
seems to be that the United States still operates in a political paradigm where curbing 
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the number of births had by unfit, dependent mothers remains a goal, even if eugenic 
sterilization is no longer considered a valid means.87  
Again, enablement describes the intersection of state-sponsored injustice and 
structural injustice, as well as how the state’s unjust practices entrench the social goals 
underlying these practices, contributing to structural harms. Let us turn, finally, to the 
category that goes hand-in-hand with enablement: namely, state-sponsored injustice’s 
influence on norms and beliefs. 
 
Norm- and Belief-Influence 
Recall that eugenic sterilization laws were preceded by an active eugenics 
movement. The eugenics movement’s presence does not necessarily mean that the 
majority of Americans shared its beliefs. However, an effect of authorizing, protecting, 
systemizing, and executing eugenic sterilization laws is the normalization and diffusion 
of eugenic ideas, which can feed into and reinforce an ideological climate in which 
both a given state-sponsored injustice and attendant structural injustices go 
unchallenged. This is described by norm- and belief-influence. 
The influence of the law on norms is something to which legal theorists have 
called attention.88 Because the law “expresses normative principles and symbolizes 
societal values,” as Richard McAdams puts it, it has a “moralizing” character.89 The 
law is one of the major sources from which individuals learn what is considered right 
and wrong in their society, helping form broad standards of conduct that individuals 
often follow without thinking.90 Though legal change almost always indicates a shift in 
societal norms, it can likewise further this shift along. Take the example of antismoking 
laws. In a short span of time, smoking in workplaces, bars, and restaurants went from 
being incredibly common to almost taboo. Smoking indoors did not decline only 
because restaurant owners feared legal repercussions. Rather, antismoking laws 
bolstered an antismoking norm so much that, as McAdams argues, it was not long 
before enforcement became entirely informal.91 
A norm is a behavioral convention, or to use Edna Ullmann-Margalit’s 
definition, “a regularity such that people generally conform with it” and “generally 
approve of conformity to it and disapprove of deviance from it.”92 By what means, 
then, does a norm’s observance garner approval and regularize behavior? The notion 
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of “beliefs” and “belief systems” is essential to any account of norms; it is due to the 
fact that members of a society share certain beliefs that converging on behaviors 
through the mechanisms of approval and disapproval are possible. Beliefs often are 
not rationally determined. They can be internalized through social conditioning 
without conscious processing. As McAdams observes, this can take place by indicating 
the state of public opinion.93 That antismoking legislation passed publicized the 
information that enough Americans saw smokers as “unhappy addicts” and second-
hand smoke as a health hazard for “a well-financed tobacco lobby” to be defeated.94 
Hence an antismoking norm was preceded by the dispersion of new beliefs about 
where smoking may reasonably take place. 
In the literature on law and norms, authors often use examples in which new 
laws encourage salutary societal change: antismoking norms superseding smoking 
norms with the help of antismoking legislation, norms of racial equality superseding 
norms of racial discrimination with the help of civil rights legislation, and so on.95 But 
just as “enacting a law might change the equilibrium and cause most people to switch 
behavior from wrong to right,” to use Robert Cooter’s words, the enactment of a new 
law can “tip aggregate behavior” in the other direction.96 The human social world is 
not characterized by a stable set of values and meanings. There is uncertainty and 
ambiguity, and often we are hard-pressed for information as to what to believe and 
how to behave, especially when faced with novelty and change.97 That the law often 
“tracks” morality, as Cooter puts it, is a common enough notion that people are not 
irrational to take cues about right and wrong from it.98 Injustice is often argued for in 
language compatible with broader political values; many eugenicists were progressives 
who framed their agenda as essential to the preservation of democracy.99 In this light, 
it is not hard to see how many would not rationally process that a law is extreme and 
unjust, and unthinkingly internalize it as part of a larger public morality. 
Going back to our example, eugenic sterilization laws cultivated the perception 
of a dependent class whose societal presence threatened the public welfare, and who 
could be reasonably bred out of existence. It is the normative influence of sterilization 
laws that explains why doctors saw themselves as deputized to perform sterilization 
surgeries unlawfully, forging consent forms or performing Mississippi 
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appendectomies. Further, it seems fairly safe to suppose that eugenic sterilization laws 
did more than nourishing societal norms that obscured the injustice of eugenic 
sterilization. For example, Robert Hayman traces a host of legal norms and social 
practices surrounding the presumptive unfitness of the “mentally retarded parent”—
e.g., the court-ordered placement of a child in foster care or a group home instead of 
allowing her to live with her biological mom or dad—to state sterilization laws and the 
Buck decision.100 More broadly, disability theorists have long been attune to the socially 
constructed elements of mental and physical disabilities, demonstrating many of the 
operative distinctions today to be historically contingent and arbitrary. Surely these 
authors are right that in the U.S., over half a century of eugenic sterilization played a 
non-negligible role in modern constructs of disability and ability.101 
 
Responsibility for State-Sponsored Injustice 
We began our inquiry by looking at how an agential conception on its own is 
not sufficient for understanding state-sponsored injustice, and how it can be enriched 
by insights from structural injustice theory. Authorization, protection, systemization, 
execution, enablement, and norm- and belief-influence were put forward as the most 
important components of a structurally-sensitive conception of state-sponsored 
injustice. As has been argued, the harm of state-sponsored injustice consists of both 
first-order wrongs and contributions to unjust structural formations. 
 On a structurally-sensitive conception of state-sponsored injustice, where 
should moral responsibility be located? Let us return to Young, and the contrast she 
sets up between a “liability” model of responsibility and a forward-looking “social 
connection” (sometimes called “political”) model.102 Again, Young does not reject the 
liability model wholesale, but rather thinks it is inappropriately applied to situations of 
structural injustice. If important aspects of state-sponsored injustice are structural, 
should the social connection model, rather than the liability model, be employed?  
 In the case of eugenic sterilization, it would be wrong to give up on the liability 
model. Those who are harmed may well have an understanding of the role of broader, 
impersonal social structures in state-sponsored injustice’s operation. Yet they still 
rightly blame the state and state actors, whose coordination on an unjust course of 
action is an essential aspect of the nature of the wrong that was done. Recall Tony 
Riddick’s specific complaint that “the state’s money and the state’s authority” were 
used to sterilize his mother. His words came as part of his testimony before a taskforce 
charged with determining appropriate redress for sterilization victims in North 
Carolina, and Riddick made clear his view that the state of North Carolina owed its 
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accountability to his mother. Karen Beck testified before the same taskforce: “Can the 
state fix this problem? Can it go back and mend the bodies they broke and restore all 
those stolen legacies? No, it can’t,” Beck reasoned. “But I’ll tell you what it can do. It 
can say it’s sorry in a way that’s meaningful. It can breach the walls of shame and guilt 
it erected and it can make restitution.”103 In their testimonies, Riddick and Beck 
represent the state of North Carolina as a moral agent, holding it responsible for past 
harm and a present duty of redress. In doing so, they call state power to account, 
indicting the state system (despite its complicated boundaries, despite the complexities 
of responsibility within the state system) for using political authority in service of a 
project that caused irreparable harm. Far from suggesting an inadequate theorization 
of state-sponsored injustice, they properly ascribe responsibility to the state as the 
locus of political authority and power.104 Officials acting on the state’s behalf owe it to 
them to accept blame and make efforts to repair the harm, offering an apology and 
redress.105  
However, the harm of state-sponsored injustice goes beyond first-order harms. 
Recall the structural harms to which the practice of eugenic sterilization contributed. 
The practice targeted women of color in the postwar period, diffusely impacting those 
who were not sterilized by putting their reproductive lives at the center of public 
debate over poverty and character. It set a precedent for later policy measures designed 
to curb the birthrates of “unfit” mothers. It helped form norms about the 
permissibility of sterilizing patients without their consent, as well as contributing to 
the stigmatization of disability. Does the state owe its accountability for eugenic 
sterilization’s structural dimensions, or just for sterilizing individual men and women? 
 A possible Youngian response would be that the answer is not terribly 
important. Individuals share the responsibility to transform unjust structures. In order 
to fulfill this responsibility, they may employ the power of, or initiate reforms within, 
the state and state institutions.106 Whether the state has its own set of obligations is 
arguably immaterial. 
But as I have tried to show, identifiable structural injustices may be facilitated 
by particular state-sponsored injustices. In such cases, the state’s contributory role, 
paired with its authority and resources, would seem to give it special responsibilities in 
dismantling these structural injustices. I am not suggesting that the state would have 
the same kinds of remedial obligations vis-à-vis structural harms to which it 
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contributed as it does for the direct harms caused by its policies. No one thing creates 
an unjust structure, and the harm of any single agent’s contribution is diffuse—which 
is why Young is skeptical that moral blame applies. The state would thus not seem to 
have a backward-looking responsibility to individuals to whose structurally unjust 
situations state policies contributed. Nevertheless, we might think of the state—
represented, as always, by state officials acting on the state’s behalf—as a distinct actor 
in a social connection model of responsibility with forward-looking obligations to 
these individuals.  
However, the individuals harmed by state-sponsored injustice in a first-order 
sense live within, and are often affected by, social structural formations shaped and 
fortified by the harmful policies. If they successfully obtain redress and an apology for 
state-sponsored injustice, these individuals may not trust that the state is actually being 
meaningfully accountable if the unjust structures remain intact. The state thus may 
have a backward-looking responsibility to the parties immediately harmed by its 
policies to work to transform unjust structures, in addition to its forward-looking 
obligations to do so. 
Of course, the work of transforming unjust structures is extremely difficult.107 
It cannot be accomplished in a single effort. The state’s obligations are likely to begin 
with state officials’ identifying unjust structures connected to the state-sponsored 
injustice in question, thinking expansively about concrete policies and programs that 
could alter these structures, and implementing some of the most promising ones. In 
political apologies, it is fairly conventional for state officials to address wrongs that 
extend beyond first-order instances of harm, and make promises to work to create a 
better world. Too often these promises are empty. But genuine accountability for state-
sponsored injustice may require a concrete, acted-upon commitment for the state to 
do its part to transform unjust structures.108 
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